
Exhibit F

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1
                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
 2
   SHANNON PHILLIPS,
                                      : CRIMINAL ACTION NUMBER:
 .3
              Plaintiff,
                                      : 19-19432
 4
              v.
 5
   STARBUCKS CORPORATION d/b/a
                                      : JURY TRIAL
   STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY,
                                      : VOLUME 6
                                      : PAGES 821 - 878
             Defendant.
 7
 8
        Mitchell H. Cohen Building & U.S. Courthouse
         4th & Cooper Streets
 9
         Camden, New Jersey 08101
         June 12, 2023
10
         Commencing at 9:29 a.m.
11
    BEFORE:
                       THE HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY,
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12
    APPEARANCES:
13
14
         CONSOLE MATTIACCI LAW, LLC
         BY: LAURA C. MATTIACCI, ESQUIRE
15
         BY: KATHERINE C. OELTJEN, ESQUIRE
         BY: HOLLY W. SMITH, ESQUIRE
16
         1525 Locust Street, Ninth Floor
         Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
17
         For the Plaintiff
18
         HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
19
         BY: RICHARD HARRIS, ESQUIRE
         BY: TARA PARAM, ESQUIRE
20
         BY: KATHLEEN PRINCIVALLE, ESOUIRE
         2929 Arch Street, Suite 800
21
         Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
         For the Defendant
22
23
      Ann Marie Mitchell, CRR, RDR, CCR, Official Court Reporter
                   AnnMarie Mitchell@njd.uscourts.gov
24
                            (856) 576-7018
25
     Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript
              produced by computer-aided transcription.
```

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1
 2
    ALSO PRESENT:
 3
 4
         SHANNON PHILLIPS, Plaintiff
 5
         ROBYN RUDERMAN, ESQUIRE, Starbucks Corporation
 6
        MARCUS ECKENSBERGER, Starbucks Corporation
 7
        MATTHEW HIGGINS, Courtroom Deputy
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             (PROCEEDINGS held in open court before The Honorable
 2
    JOEL H. SLOMSKY at 9:29 a.m.)
 3
             THE COURT: Please be seated.
             Let's wait for Mr. Harris.
 4
 5
             MS. PARAM: Thank you.
 6
             MR. HARRIS: Good morning, Your Honor.
 7
             THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, I just wanted to bring to
    your attention, I noticed something else on the verdict slip
    that should have been included. And that is after question
10
    11, I think on your version, it says: If you answered yes to
11
    question 11, please proceed to question 12.
12
             And I added "If you answered no to question 11, your
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    deliberations are finished and you are to follow the
    instructions after question 12," because they wouldn't know
14
15
    what to do at that point. All right?
16
             So I added that to the jury instruction.
17
             MS. MATTIACCI: Okay, Your Honor. Thank you.
18
             THE COURT: And two slight changes to the jury
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    instructions.
20
             I made that change to the Jury Verdict Form, but I
21
    have two slight changes to the jury instructions.
22
             Let's see. The first one would be on page 17. And
23
    in the third full paragraph, I changed the word "of" to
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    "under." It is permissible for a plaintiff to allege a claim
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    under these two civil rights statutes. All right?
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And the only other changes that we noticed -- in the
mixed motive charge under Title VII on page 20 -- page 21, if
you look under the charge on pretext, if you look on page 18,
at the very bottom, it says: You should weigh all the
evidence received in this case in deciding whether defendant
intentionally discriminated against plaintiff.
         And for some reason, that language was not included,
and it should have been in the mixed motive instruction.
                                                          So
we added to page 21, after the "although" paragraph, "Although
plaintiff must prove" -- I don't think your copy has the next
sentence as a separate paragraph in and of itself saying:
should weigh all the evidence received in this case in
deciding whether defendant intentionally discriminated against
plaintiff.
         It should be parallel to the other instruction.
        MR. HARRIS: Yes.
        MS. MATTIACCI: Okay.
         MR. HARRIS: Yes.
         THE COURT: All right? So those are the only changes
made over the weekend break.
         MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, could we have a copy of the
final version?
         THE COURT: Oh, yes. Yes, we have copies for you of
the final instructions and the verdict sheet.
        MR. HARRIS: Thanks.
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             THE COURT: All right. And at this point, we can
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    bring in the jury, and I'll instruct them on the law.
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             (Jury in.)
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             THE COURT: Please be seated.
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             Good morning, members of the jury.
 6
             RESPONSE: Good morning.
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             THE COURT: Everyone had a good weekend?
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             Members of the jury, now that you have heard the
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    evidence and the arguments, it is my duty to instruct you on
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    the applicable law. It is your duty to follow the law as I
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    will state it and to apply it to the facts as you find them
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    from the evidence in the case. Do not single out one
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    instruction as stating the law, but consider the instructions
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    as a whole. You are not to be concerned about the wisdom of
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    any rule of law stated by me. You must follow and apply the
16
    law.
17
             Nothing I say in these instructions indicates that I
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    have any opinion about the facts. You, not I, have the duty
19
    to determine the facts.
20
             You must perform your duties as jurors without bias
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    or prejudice as to any party. The law does not permit you to
22
    be controlled by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. All
23
    parties expect that you will carefully and impartially
24
    consider all the evidence, follow the law as it is now being
25
    given to you and reach a just verdict regardless of the
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consequences.

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Members of the jury, the judge and the jury have separate and distinct functions. You, the jury, must determine what the facts are in this case. You have listened to all the evidence, and from that evidence, you will determine what you consider the facts to be.

In deciding what really happened in this case, it is your recollection of the evidence you must follow, not the recollection of the attorneys, or even mine, or even me. If any attorney has stated something to be a fact or if I state something to be a fact at any time, and it is not the same as your recollection of the evidence, then your recollection of the evidence controls.

You must make your determination of the facts solely on the basis of the evidence you have heard and seen and not for any reasons outside the record of this case. You cannot base your verdict on guess, suspicion, speculation, intuition or conjecture. In short, you must determine where the real truth lies as to the facts in this case. Once you have determined what the facts are, then you must apply the law as I give it to you now.

The function of the judge is to conduct the trial in an orderly, fair and efficient manner and to rule upon questions of law during the course of the trial. It is also my function to instruct you as to the law which applies to

this case, as I am doing now.

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It is your duty to accept the law as I state it. No one can question the facts as you find them. Likewise, you cannot question the law as I give it to you. You may not disregard my instruction. You must not give special attention to any one instruction or question the wisdom of any rule of law. You should consider all the instructions as a whole.

During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smartphone, iPhone, or a computer; the internet, any internet service or any text or instant messaging service or any internet chat room, blog or website such as Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict.

The evidence from which you are to find the facts consist of the following: The testimony of the witnesses; documents and other things received as exhibits; and any facts that are stipulated; that is, formally agreed to by the parties.

The following things are not evidence: Statements, arguments and questions of the lawyers for the parties in this case; objections by lawyers; any testimony I tell you to

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disregard; and anything you may see or hear about this case outside the courtroom.

You must make your decision based only on the evidence that you see and hear in court. Do not let rumors, suspicion or anything else that you may see or hear outside of court influence your decisions in any way.

You should use your common sense in weighing the evidence. Consider it in light of your everyday experience with people and events, and give it whatever weight you believe it deserves. If your experience tells you that certain evidence reasonably leads to a conclusion, you are free to reach that conclusion.

There are rules that control what can be received into evidence. When a lawyer asks a question or offers an exhibit into evidence and the lawyer on the other side thinks that it is not permitted by the rules of evidence, that lawyer may object. This simply means that the lawyer is requesting that I make a decision on a particular rule of evidence.

You should not be influenced by the fact that an objection is made. Objections to questions are not evidence. Lawyers have an obligation to their clients to make objections when they believe that evidence being offered is improper under the rules of evidence.

You should not be influenced by the objection or by the Court's rulings on it. If the objection is sustained,

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ignore the question. If it is overruled, treat the answer like any other. If you are instructed that some item of evidence is received for a limited purpose, you must follow that instruction.

Also, certain testimony or other evidence may be ordered struck from the record, and you will be instructed to disregard this evidence. Do not consider any testimony or any evidence that gets struck or excluded. Do not speculate about what a witness might have said or what an exhibit might have shown.

During trial, I may have asked witnesses questions. Please do not assume that I have any opinion about the subject matter of my questions. Such questioning was done to clarify matters, and no opinion should be drawn as to the judge's views on any of the matters to which the questions related. My questions were not meant to help one side of the case or harm another side.

Please remember at all times that you, as jurors, are the sole judges of the facts of this case.

As I mentioned earlier in this trial, there are two types of evidence. One is direct evidence, such as the testimony of an eyewitness and any exhibits introduced into evidence. The other is circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence consisting of facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction from which

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you may infer other connected facts which reasonably follow according to the common experiences of people.

You are not to -- you are to consider only the evidence admitted in this case, but in your considerations, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You are permitted to draw from the facts which you find to have been proven such reasonable inferences as you feel justified in light of your experience. Inferences are conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to reach from facts established by the evidence in the case.

No party is required to produce all possible witnesses who may have some knowledge about the facts of the case or to produce all possible documents. It is the quality, not the quantity, of the evidence that is important.

Inferences are deductions or conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts established by the evidence in the case. You may draw from the facts that you find such reasonable inferences as seem justified in light of your experience; however, you are to consider only the evidence in the case and the reasonable inferences that you draw therefrom.

Counsel have made a number of motions and objections during the course of the trial. They have done that according to the law, and it is their duty in fairly representing their clients to make such motions and objections. The fact that I

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have sustained or overruled objections in the course of the trial is not to be taken by you as any indication that I have an opinion as to what your findings should be. My rulings must have no bearing directly or indirectly on your deliberations or the outcome of this case. In ruling, I was applying the rules of evidence in restricting the testimony to only what the rules permit. You, the jury, must confine your consideration to the evidence presented from the witnesses and from any exhibits admitted in evidence.

The questions asked by a lawyer or either party to this case are not evidence. If a lawyer asks a question of a witness, which contains an assertion of fact, you may not consider the assertion by the lawyer as evidence of that fact. Only the witnesses' answers are evidence. If the witness adopts the assertion of fact in the answer, then you may consider the questions as part of the answer.

You may consider the question since it may put the answer in context or in some way frame the answer, but, again, please remember that only the witnesses's answers are evidence.

If during the course of the trial, I sustained an objection by counsel to a question asked by other counsel, you are to disregard the question, and you must not speculate as to what the answer would have been.

If after a question was asked and an answer given by

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a witness, I rule that the answer should be stricken from the record, you are to disregard both the question and the answer in your deliberations.

In your consideration of this case, you must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness called to testify in this case. Only you can determine the importance or the weight that the witness's testimony deserves. I have nothing to do with that determination.

After you make your assessment concerning the credibility of a witness, you may decide to believe all of that witness's testimony, only a part of it, or none of it.

You may judge the credibility of the witnesses by the manner in which they gave testimony, their demeanor upon the stand, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the testimony, the source of their knowledge about what they testified, their interest in the case, the bias the witnesses may have for or against any of the parties or any circumstances tending to shed light upon the truth or falsity of the witness' testimony.

Consider each witness's ability to observe the matters as to which he or she has testified. And consider whether he or she impresses you as having an accurate memory or recollection of these matters.

It is for you to say what weight you will give to the

testimony from any and all witnesses.

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Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you to disbelieve or discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an event may simply see or hear it differently.

In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance or to an insignificant detail. And consider whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or from intentional falsehood.

If you believe that any witness has intentionally testified falsely as to any material fact of this case, you are free to disbelieve the testimony of that witness in whole or in part or believe it in part and disbelieve it in part, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case.

The testimony of a witness may be discredited by showing that he or she previously made statements which are different than or inconsistent with his or her testimony here in court. Generally, the earlier inconsistent or contradictory statements can be used to discredit or impeach the credibility of the witness and not to establish the truth of those earlier statements made elsewhere. However, if the prior statement was given under oath, that earlier statement may be considered for its truth.

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It is for you to determine whether to believe all, some or none of the testimony of a witness who has made prior inconsistent or contradictory statements.

In considering a prior inconsistent statement, you should consider whether it was simply an innocent error or an intentional falsehood or whether it contains an important fact or an unimportant detail.

If a person is shown to have knowingly testified falsely concerning any important or material matter, you obviously have a right to distrust the testimony of such witness concerning other matters. You may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such weight or credibility as you may think it deserves.

You are not required to accept testimony, even though the testimony is uncontradicted and the witness is not impeached. You may decide because of the witness's bearing and demeanor or the inherent improbability of his or her testimony or for some other reasons that such testimony is not worthy of belief.

After you have made your own judgment or assessment about the believability of a witness, you can then attach such importance or weight to that testimony, if any, that you feel it deserves.

In making up your minds in reaching a verdict, do not make any decision simply because there are more witnesses on

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one side than the other. Your job is to think about the testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what he or she had to say and how much weight to give to that testimony.

The weight of the evidence to prove a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of witnesses who testify.

What is more important is how believable the witnesses were and how much weight you think their testimony deserves.

This is a civil case. Plaintiff is the party who brought this lawsuit. The defendant is the party against which the lawsuit was filed. In civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving its case by what is called the preponderance of the evidence. That means that plaintiff must produce evidence which, considered in the light of all the facts, leads you to believe what she claims is more likely true than not.

To put it differently, if you were to put plaintiff's and defendant's evidence on opposite sides of the scales, plaintiff's evidence would have to make the scales tip somewhat on her side. If plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the verdict must be for the defendant.

If you find, after considering all the evidence, that a claim or fact is more likely so than not so, then the claim or fact has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

In determining whether any fact has been proved by a

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preponderance to the evidence in this case, you may, unless otherwise instructed, consider the testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.

In this case, plaintiff Shannon Phillips has brought three claims against defendant Starbucks Corporation.

The first claim is under a Federal Civil Rights

Statute that we refer to as Title VII. This statute prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of the employee's race.

More specifically, plaintiff claims that she was terminated by defendant because of her race.

Second, plaintiff has made a claim under a second

Federal Civil Rights statute that we refer to as Section 1981.

This statute also prohibits discrimination against an employee because of that person's race.

Again, plaintiff claims that she was terminated by defendant because of her race, in violation of this statute.

It is permissible for a plaintiff to allege a claim under these two civil rights statutes that prohibit employers from discriminating against an employee in the terms and conditions of their employment because of the employee's race, because these statutes have different elements under the law.

I will shortly describe to you the elements of these

two statutes.

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Finally, in this case, plaintiff has made a claim under a New Jersey state civil rights statute referred to as the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. It also prohibits discrimination against an employee by an employer because of an employee's race.

Again, I will instruct you on the law of each of these three claims which more fully describe the issues you must address in this case. With respect to these three claims, defendant denies that plaintiff was discriminated against in any way.

In this case, the first claim of race discrimination is made under Title VII. There are two ways in which a plaintiff may prove a Title VII violation. Plaintiff is alleging that defendant terminated her because of her race.

First, in order for plaintiff to recover on this discrimination claim against defendant, plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff.

This means that plaintiff must prove that her race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision to terminate her.

To prevail on this claim, plaintiff must prove both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence.

First: Defendant terminated plaintiff; and second: Plaintiff's race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision.

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Although plaintiff must prove that defendant acted with the intent to discriminate, plaintiff is not required to prove that defendant acted with the particular intent to violate plaintiff's federal civil rights. Moreover, plaintiff is not required to produce direct evidence of intent such as statements admitting discrimination. Intentional discrimination may be inferred from the existence of other facts. You should weigh all the evidence received in this case in deciding whether defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff. Defendant has given a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff. If you believe defendant's stated reason, and if you find that the termination would have occurred because of defendant's stated reason, regardless of plaintiff's race, then you must find for defendant. If you disbelieve defendant's stated reason for its conduct, then you may, but need not, find that plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination. In determining whether defendant's stated reason for its actions was a pretext or excuse for discrimination, you may not question defendant's business judgment.

You cannot find intentional discrimination simply because you disagree with the business judgment of defendant

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or believe it is harsh and unreasonable. You are not to consider defendant's wisdom. However, you may consider whether plaintiff has proven that defendant's reason is merely a cover-up for discrimination.

Plaintiff does not have to prove that race was the only reason for her termination, but ultimately you must decide whether plaintiff has proven that her race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision to terminate her.

Determinative factor means that if not for plaintiff's race, the termination would not have occurred.

There is a second way in which a plaintiff can prove race discrimination under Title VII.

In order for plaintiff to recover on this discrimination claim against defendant, plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff. This means that plaintiff must prove that her race was a motivating factor in defendant's decision to terminate her.

To prevail on this claim, plaintiff must prove both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: First, defendant terminated plaintiff; and second, plaintiff's race was a motivating factor in defendant's decision. Again, second, plaintiff's race was a motivating factor in defendant's decision.

Although plaintiff must prove that defendant acted with the intent to discriminate, plaintiff is not required to

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prove that defendant acted with the particular intent to violate plaintiff's federal civil rights. In showing that plaintiff's race was a motivating factor for defendant's action, plaintiff is not required to prove that her race was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for defendant's decision. Plaintiff need only prove that plaintiff's race played a motivating part in defendant's decision, even though other factors may have also motivated defendant.

As used in this instruction, plaintiff's race was a motivating factor if her race played a part in defendant's decision to terminate her.

Section 1981 is the second statute plaintiff claims defendant violated by discriminating against her in her employment based on race.

In order for plaintiff to recover on this discrimination claim against defendant, plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff. This means that plaintiff must prove that her race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision to terminate her.

To prevail on this claim, plaintiff must prove both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: First, defendant terminated plaintiff; and second, plaintiff's race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision.

Although plaintiff must prove that defendant acted

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with the intent to discriminate, plaintiff is not required to prove that defendant acted with the particular intent to violate plaintiff's federal civil rights.

Moreover, plaintiff is not required to produce direct evidence of intent, such as statements admitting the discrimination. Intentional discrimination may be inferred from the existence of other facts.

You should weigh all of the evidence received in the case in deciding whether defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff.

Defendant has given a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff. If you believe defendant's stated reason and if you find that the termination would have occurred because of defendant's stated reason regardless of the plaintiff's race, then you must find for defendants.

If you disbelieve defendant's stated reason for its conduct, then you may, but need not, find that plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination.

In determining whether defendant's stated reason for its action was pretext or excuse for discrimination, you may not question defendant's business judgment. You cannot find intentional discrimination simply because you disagree with the business judgment of defendant or believe it is harsh or unreasonable.

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You are not to consider defendant's wisdom. However, you may consider whether plaintiff has proven that defendant's reason is merely a cover-up for discrimination.

Plaintiff does not have to prove that race was the only reason for her termination, but ultimately you must decide whether plaintiff has proven that her race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff. Again, determinative factor means that if not for a plaintiff's race, the termination would not have occurred.

I am now going to instruct you on damages.

These instructions apply to the Title VII claim and the Section 1981 claim. And just because I am instructing you on how to -- on the damages does not mean that I have any opinion on whether or not defendant should be held liable.

If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff by terminating her, then you must consider the issue of compensatory damages. You must award plaintiff an amount that will fairly compensate her for any injury she actually sustained as a result of defendant's conduct. The damages that you award must be fair compensation, no more and no less. The award of compensatory damages is meant to put plaintiff in the position she would have occupied if the discrimination had not occurred. Plaintiff has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

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Plaintiff must show that the injury would not have occurred without defendant's act. Plaintiff must also show that defendant's act played a substantial part in bringing about the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of defendant's act.

This test, a substantial part in bringing about the injury, is to be distinguished from the test you must apply in determining whether defendant's actions were motivated by discrimination. In other words, even assuming that defendant's actions were motivated by discrimination, plaintiff is not entitled to damages for an injury unless defendant's discriminatory actions actually played a substantial part in bringing about that injury.

In determining the amount of any damages that you decide to award, you should be guided by your common sense.

You must use sound judgment in affixing an award of damages, drawing reasonable inferences from the facts in the case. You may not award damages based on sympathy, speculation or guesswork.

You may award damages for any pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish or loss of enjoyment of life that plaintiff experienced as a consequence of defendant's allegedly unlawful act. No evidence of a monetary value of such intangible things as pain and suffering has been or need

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be introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for affixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damages. Any award you make should be fair in light of the evidence presented at the trial.

I instruct you that in awarding compensatory damages you are not to award damages for the amount of wages that plaintiff would have earned, either in the past or in the future, if she had continued in employment with defendant. These elements of recovery of wages that plaintiff would have received from defendant are called back pay or front pay, and under the applicable law, the determination of back pay or front pay is for the Court to decide.

You may award damages for monetary losses that plaintiff may suffer in the future as a result of the allegedly unlawful act. For example, you may award damages for loss of earnings resulting from any harm to plaintiff's reputation that was suffered as a result of defendant's allegedly unlawful act. Where a victim of discrimination has been terminated by an employer and has sued that employer for discrimination, she may find it more difficult to be employed in the future or may have to take a job that pays less than if the discrimination had not occurred. The element of damages — that element of damages is distinct from the amount of wages plaintiff would have earned in the future from defendant if she had retained the job.

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As I instructed you previously, plaintiff has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence, but the law does not require that plaintiff prove the amount of her losses with mathematical precision. It requires only as much definiteness and accuracy as circumstances permit.

You are instructed that plaintiff has a duty under the law to mitigate her damages. That means that plaintiff must take advantage of any reasonable opportunity that may have existed under the circumstances to reduce or minimize the loss or damage caused by defendant. It is defendant's burden to prove that plaintiff has failed to mitigate, so if defendant persuades you by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff has failed to take advantage of an opportunity that was reasonably available to her, then you must reduce the amount of plaintiff's damages by the amount that could have been reasonably obtained if she had taken advantage of such an opportunity.

In assessing damages, you must not consider attorneys' fees or costs of litigating this case. Attorneys' fees and costs, if relevant at all, are for the Court and not the jury to determine; therefore, attorneys' fees and costs should play no part in your calculation of any damages.

You will also consider the issue of punitive damages as they apply under Title VII -- as they apply to Title VII and Section 1981 claims.

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Plaintiff claims the acts of defendant were done with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights and that as a result, there should be an award of what are called punitive damages. A jury may award punitive damages to punish a defendant or to deter defendant and others like defendant from committing such conduct in the future. Where appropriate, the jury may award punitive damages even if plaintiff suffered no actual injury and so receives nominal rather than compensatory damages.

However, punitive damages cannot be imposed on an employer where its employees acted contrary to the employer's own good faith efforts to comply with the law by implementing policies and procedures designed to prevent unlawful discrimination in the workplace. An award of punitive damages against defendant is therefore permissible in the case only if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a management official of defendant personally acted with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. An action is with reckless indifference if taken with knowledge that it may violate the law.

But even if you make a finding that there has been an act of discrimination with reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights, you cannot award punitive damages if defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it made a good faith attempt to comply with the law by adopting policies and

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procedures designed to prevent unlawful discrimination such as that occurred by plaintiff.

An award of punitive damages is discretionary; that is, if you find that the legal requirements of punitive damages are satisfied and that defendant has not proved that it made a good faith attempt to comply with the law, then you may decide to award punitive damages, or you may decide not to award them. I will now discuss some considerations that should guide your exercise of this discretion.

If you have found the elements permitting punitive damages as discussed in this instruction, then you are to consider the purposes of punitive damages. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a defendant for reckless disregard of federal rights, would it deter a defendant and others like defendant from doing similar things in the future or both. Thus, you may consider whether to award punitive damages to punish defendant. You should also consider whether actual damages standing alone are sufficient to deter or prevent defendant from, again, performing any wrongful acts it may have performed. Finally, you should consider whether an award of punitive damages in this case is likely to deter others from performing wrongful acts similar to those defendant may have committed.

If you decide to award punitive damages, then you should also consider the purposes of punitive damages in

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deciding the amount of punitive damages to award; that is, in deciding the amount of punitive damages, you should consider the degree to which defendant should be punished for its wrongful conduct and the degree to which an award of one sum or another will deter defendant or others from committing similar wrongful acts in the future.

The extent to which a particular amount of money will adequately punish a defendant and the extent to which a particular amount will adequately deter or prevent future misconduct may depend upon defendant's financial resources.

Therefore, if you find that punitive damages should be awarded against defendant, you may consider the financial resources of defendant in affixing the amount of those damages.

I will now instruct you on the elements of a discrimination claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

Plaintiff claims that defendant unlawfully discriminated against her by terminating plaintiff's employment because of plaintiff's race. Defendant denies these allegations and instead maintains that it terminated plaintiff because of her performance. If defendant did, in fact, terminate plaintiff because of her race, that would be unlawful under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

It is plaintiff's burden to prove that it is more likely than not that defendant engaged in intentional

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discrimination because of plaintiff's race. That is the ultimate issue you must decide: Did defendant terminate plaintiff because plaintiff's -- because of her race? Plaintiff may do this directly, by proving that a discriminatory reason -- by proving a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated defendant's action, or indirectly, by proving that defendant's stated reason for its action is not the real reason for its action. You may find that defendant had more than one reason or motivation for its actions. For example, you may find that defendant was motivated both by plaintiff's race and by other nondiscriminatory factors such as plaintiff's job performance. To prevail, plaintiff is not required to prove that plaintiff's race was the only reason or motivation for defendant's actions; rather, plaintiff must prove -- only prove that plaintiff's race played a role in their decision and that it made an actual difference in defendant's decision. If you find that plaintiff's race did make an actual difference in defendant's decision, then you must enter judgment for plaintiff. If, however, you find that defendant would have made the same decision regardless of plaintiff's race, then you may enter a judgment for defendant. Because direct proof of intentional discrimination is often not available, plaintiff is allowed to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence. In this regard,

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you are to evaluate all of the indirect evidence of discrimination that you find was presented during the trial. In particular, you should consider whether the explanation given by defendant for plaintiff's actions was the real reason for its actions.

If you do not believe the reason given by defendant is the real reason defendant terminated plaintiff, you may, but are not required, to find that plaintiff has proven her case of discrimination. You are permitted to do so because if you find defendant has not told the truth about why it acted, you may conclude that it is hiding the discrimination; however, while you are permitted to find discrimination based upon your disbelief of defendant's stated reasons, you are not required to do so. This is because you may conclude that defendant's stated reason is not the real reason but that the real reason is something other than illegal discrimination.

Let me give you an example of what I am talking about. Assume that an employee claims plaintiff was discharged because of plaintiff's age, and the employer's claim, plaintiff was discharged because of excessive absenteeism. If you were to conclude that the employer's explanation is false and that it did not really discharge the employee because of excessive absenteeism, you would be permitted to find that the real reason was because of the employee's age. However, you would not be required to find

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that the real reason was because of the employee's age, because you might find that the real reason had nothing to do with the -- with illegal discrimination. For example, you might find that the real reason was because the employer simply did not like the employee.

Plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of convincing you that it is more likely than not that defendant engaged in the intentional discrimination. To decide whether plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination, you should consider all of the evidence presented by the parties using the guidelines I gave you in the beginning of my instructions regarding evaluating evidence generally, such as weighing the credibility of witnesses. Keep in mind that in reaching your determination of whether defendant engaged in intentional discrimination, you are instructed that defendant's actions and business practices need not be fair, wise, reasonable, moral or even right, so long as plaintiff's race was a motivating factor for the termination.

I remind you that the ultimate issue you must decide is whether defendant engaged in illegal race discrimination by terminating plaintiff, and then plaintiff has the burden to prove that the discrimination occurred.

I'm now going to instruct you on how compensatory damages are considered -- are to be considered by you as they apply to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

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If you find for the plaintiff, she is entitled to recover fair and reasonable money damages for the full extent of harm caused, no more and no less.

A plaintiff who is awarded a verdict is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for any emotional distress she has suffered that was the proximate result of defendant's unlawful conduct.

Plaintiff is not seeking damages for emotional distress continuing into the future; rather, she is only seeking damages for the emotional distress she has suffered from the date of defendant's unlawful conduct through the date of your verdict. Emotional distress includes embarrassment, humiliation, indignity and other mental anguish.

The measure of damages is what a reasonable person would consider to be adequate and just under all the circumstances of the case to compensate plaintiff for her emotional distress.

You should consider the nature, character and seriousness of any emotional distress. You must also consider the duration of the emotional distress as any award you make must cover the damages suffered by plaintiff to the present time.

Plaintiff has the burden of proving her damages through credible, competent evidence, although she does not have to offer any witnesses to corroborate her emotional

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distress. Distress need not be permanent. Physical or psychological symptoms are not be necessary, and plaintiff need not have obtained any type of professional treatment. Plaintiff's testimony standing alone is enough to support an award of emotional distress damages. On the other hand, you are free to disbelieve all or part of plaintiff's testimony, and if you do, you should act accordingly by either reducing the amount of damages you award for emotional distress or by not awarding any emotional distress damages at all.

The law does not provide you with any table, schedule or formula by which a person's emotional distress may be measured in terms of money. The amount is left to your sound discretion. You are to use your discretion to attempt to make plaintiff whole so far as money can do so, based upon reason and sound judgment, without any passion, prejudice, bias or sympathy. You each know from your common experience the nature of emotional distress, and you also know the nature and function of money. The task of equating the two so as to arrive at a fair and reasonable award of damages requires a high order of human judgment. For this reason, the law can provide no better yardstick for your guidance than your own impartial judgment and experience.

You are to exercise sound judgment as to what is fair, just and reasonable under all the circumstances. You should consider all of the evidence presented by the parties

1 on the subject of plaintiff's emotional distress. 2 After considering the evidence, you should award a lump sum of money that will fairly and reasonably compensate 3 plaintiff for any emotional distress you find she has proven. 5 You will also consider the issue of punitive damages 6 as they apply to New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 7 Specifically, you must first decide whether to award punitive damages against defendant, and if you decide to do so, what amount should be awarded. 10 The intent of punitive damages. You may award 11 punitive damages to plaintiff only if you find that she has 12 proved certain additional matters. 1.3 The purposes of punitive damages are different from 14 the purposes of compensatory damages. 15 Compensatory damages are intended to compensate 16 plaintiff for its actual injury or loss. I'm sorry, wait. 17 Let me just restate that. 18 Compensatory damages are intended to compensate 19 plaintiff for the actual injury or loss she suffered as a 20 result of defendant's discriminatory conduct. In contrast, 21 punitive damages are intended to punish a wrongdoer and to 22 deter the wrongdoer from similar wrongful conduct in the 23 future. 24 Punitive damages are designed to require the

wrongdoer to pay an amount of money that is sufficient to

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punish the defendant for a particular conduct and to deter that party from future discriminatory conduct.

Punitive damages are not to be awarded as a routine matter in every case. They are to be awarded only in exceptional cases, to punish a party who has acted in an especially egregious or outrageous manner and to discourage the party from engaging in similar discriminatory conduct in the future. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages simply because you have found that defendant acted ——
I'm sorry, that defendant engaged in a specific conduct or because you have awarded damages to compensate plaintiff for her injury.

You may award punitive damages to plaintiff only if you find that she has proved certain additional matters.

To support an award of punitive damages here, you must find that plaintiff has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the injury, loss or harm suffered by her was the result of defendant's acts or omissions and that defendant acted in wanton and willful disregard of plaintiff's rights.

Willful or wanton conduct is a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to another who foreseeably might be harmed by that act or omission in reckless -- and reckless indifference to the consequences of the act or omission.

Now, the standard of "clear and convincing

1.3

evidence" -- and again, this is under the New Jersey statute.

It's a clear and convincing evidence standard for punitive damages.

The standard of clear and convincing evidence which I mentioned above means evidence which leaves no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. This is different and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is also different and more than the preponderance of evidence to support an award of punitive damages.

In determining whether to award punitive damages, consider all relevant evidence, including but not limited to the following: The likelihood, at a relevant time, that serious harm would arise from defendant's conduct; two, defendant's awareness or reckless disregard of the likelihood that such serious harm would arise from its conduct; three, the conduct of defendant upon learning that its initial conduct would likely cause more harm; and, four, the duration of the conduct or any concealment of that conduct by defendant.

You must first decide whether an award of punitive damages is justified against defendant in this case. To award punitive damages against it, you must find that both of the following factors are present:

First, you must find that discrimination was

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especially egregious. If you do not find that discrimination was especially egregious, then you must not award punitive damages. In a moment, I will define especially egregious behavior. Second, if you do find that the discrimination was especially egregious, you must then also find that at least one of defendant's upper management employees actually participated in or was willfully indifferent to the wrongful conduct. You cannot award punitive damages against defendant unless there was some involvement by a member of its upper management. Especially egregious conduct is conduct that was done with a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of plaintiff. Willful and wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff means that an upper management employee deliberately acted with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to plaintiff and reckless indifference to the consequences of that act. In making your determination as to whether the discriminatory conduct of an upper management employee was especially egregious or outrageous, you must consider all the

evidence surrounding the wrongful conduct, including the

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likely -- one, the likelihood that serious harm would arise from the discrimination; two, an upper management employee's awareness or reckless disregard of the likelihood that serious harm would arise; three, an upper management employee's conduct after learning that their initial conduct would likely cause harm; and four, the duration of the wrongful conduct and any concealment of that conduct by an upper management employee.

You may not award punitive damages based solely on a finding of negligence or even gross negligence by an upper management employee. You may not award punitive damages solely because you have determined that discrimination occurred. Rather, as I have said, punitive damages are to be awarded only in those exceptional cases where the discrimination was especially egregious or outrageous.

The second factor that you must consider that you must find -- again, the second factor that you must find is that at least one of defendant's upper management employees was involved with the discrimination.

In a moment I will define the kind of involvement that you must find occurred. As an initial matter, though, you must decide whether certain of defendant's employees were part of its upper management.

To decide whether employees of defendant were part of its upper management, you must consider this: The purpose of

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defining upper management is to give employers the incentive to provide voluntary compliance programs and to insist on the effective enforcement of its programs. The employees who acted wrongfully must have had sufficient authority to make the imposition of punitive damages fair and reasonable.

Clearly, upper management includes a corporation's board of directors and its highest level executive officers.

Upper management will also include those employees responsible to formulate the corporation's antidiscrimination policies, provide compliance programs and insist on performance of such programs and those employees to whom a corporation has delegated responsibility to execute its policies in the workplace, set the atmosphere or control the day-to-day operations of the unit. This group may include heads of departments, regional managers or compliance officers.

Not all managerial employees, however, constitute upper level management. To decide which employees below the highest levels of management are included in upper management, you must analyze, weigh and consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.

For an employee on the second tier of management to be considered a member of upper management, the employee should have either, one broad supervisory powers over the involved employees, including the power to hire, fire, promote and discipline; or, two, the delegated responsibility to

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execute the employer's policies to ensure a safe, productive and discrimination-free workplace.

If you decide that some of the employees identified as -- by plaintiff as acting wrongfully were part of upper management of defendant, you cannot -- you cannot award -- let me just restate that.

If you decide that none of the employees identified by plaintiff as acting wrongfully were part of upper management of defendant, you cannot award punitive damages.

If you decide that the employees identified by plaintiff are part of the upper management of defendant, you must then consider whether any of those upper management employees actually participated in or were willfully indifferent to the discrimination that occurred.

To find that upper management actually participated in wrongful conduct, you must find that upper management employees not only knew about the wrongful conduct but also engaged in affirmative acts that accomplished that wrongful conduct.

To find willful indifference to wrongful conduct on the part of upper management, you must find that upper management employees knew about the wrongful conduct but chose to disregard or ignore it rather than to stop it.

In other words, you cannot award punitive damages against defendant simply because upper management employees

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may have been negligent in failing to learn of or reasonably respond to the discrimination. You must instead find that upper management employee or employees actually knew about those allegations and consciously chose to ignore them.

In summary, to award punitive damages against defendants, you must find by clear and convincing evidence both that an upper management employee engaged in especially egregious conduct and that an upper management employee of defendant either actively participated in the wrongful conduct or was willfully indifferent to it.

If you find that plaintiff has proved that defendant has engaged in the type of wrongdoing that justifies awarding punitive damages, you must then decide the amount of punitive damages to award. That amount must be based on your sound judgment as to what is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances. As I stated earlier, punitive damages are not to be awarded to compensate plaintiff for injuries but to punish defendant and to deter defendant from similar wrongful conduct in the future.

There is no schedule or formula to calculate the amount of punitive damages. The amount of your award of punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship to the actual injury inflicted and the cause of the injury. You must use your sound discretion in deciding this issue.

In exercising your discretion, you must consider all

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relevant evidence surrounding the wrongful conduct, including:

One, the likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm

would arise from the conduct; two, defendant's awareness or

reckless disregard of the likelihood that such serious harm

would arise from the conduct; three, the conduct of defendant

upon learning that its initial conduct would likely cause

harm; four, the duration of the conduct or any concealment of

it by defendant; five, the profitability, if any, of the

discriminatory or harassing conduct to defendant; six, when

the discriminatory conduct was terminated; and, seven,

defendant's financial condition and ability to pay the

punitive damage award.

In addition, you may also consider: The nature of the wrongful conduct; the extent of harm inflicted; the intent of defendant; whether defendant had adequate policies, procedures, training or monitoring measures designed to prevent discrimination; and whether defendant took sufficient steps after learning of the wrongful conduct to investigate and address the wrongful conduct; and any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances that you believe should reduce or increase the amount of the damages award.

After considering all of these factors, you must decide whether punitive damages should be awarded in this case, and if you decide to award punitive damages, what the proper amount should be.

1.3

Lastly, I will instruct you on nominal damages. If you return a verdict for plaintiff but plaintiff has failed to prove actual injury and therefore is not entitled to compensatory damages, then you must award nominal damages of \$1.

A person whose federal rights were violated is entitled to recognition of that violation even if she suffered no actual injury. Nominal damages of \$1 are designed to acknowledge the deprivation of a federal right even where no actual injury occurred.

However if you find an actual injury, you must award compensatory damages, as I have instructed you, rather than nominal damages.

When you retire to consider your verdict, your verdict must be unanimous; that is, all jurors must agree.

In reaching your verdict, you must determine the facts from all of the testimony you've heard and from the other evidence received during the trial. You are the sole and exclusive judge of the facts. Neither I nor anyone else may infringe upon your responsibility in that area. You must, however, accept the rules of law as I have given them to you, whether you agree with them or not, and apply the law as I have stated it to the facts that you find.

Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your number to act as your foreperson. The foreperson will

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preside over your deliberations and will be your spokesperson here in court.

A verdict form has been prepared for you, and I will send out with the jury nine copies of the verdict form: one for each of you, and the ninth one will be the -- should be signed and dated by the foreperson, and that will be the official verdict form in the case.

Again, the verdict form has been put together for you. There are different things you have to consider that are set forth on the verdict form as instructed -- as set forth in my jury instruction, but this is in effect the roadmap that you follow. It's on the verdict form. For your convenience, again, you will each have a copy of the verdict sheet. You will take the verdict form to the jury room, and when you have reached unanimous agreement as to your verdict, you will have your foreperson sign and complete each -- the form and then return with your verdict to the courtroom.

None of you should attempt to communicate with me by any other means than a note -- a note signed by the foreperson. I will not communicate with you on any subject touching the merits of the case other than in writing or orally here in open court. Any writing from me to you or you to me will be shared with counsel. At no time during your deliberations should you reveal even to me how you may stand numerically on any question before you.

1.3

I have been charging you on the law that you must apply after you have considered what the facts are in this case. Nothing I have said in my charge should be taken by you to indicate in any way what I believe the verdict should be. I have been telling you what the law of the case is. It is for you, the jury, to return your own verdict following the law as I have given it to you.

You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try the issues of fact. When you retire to the jury room, your functions will be to weigh the evidence in the case and reach a verdict solely on the basis of the evidence. Each juror is entitled to his or her own opinion. Each should, however, exchange views with his or her fellow jurors. That is the very purpose of jury deliberation: to discuss and to consider the evidence, to listen to the arguments of fellow jurors, to present your individual views, to consult with one another, and to reach an agreement based solely and wholly on the evidence if you can do so without violence to your own judgment.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, after consideration with your fellow jurors, on the evidence of the case. But you should not hesitate to change an opinion you made which, after discussion with your fellow jurors, appears erroneous. But, if after carefully considering all the evidence and arguments of your fellow jurors, you entertain

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1
    the conscientious view that differs from others, you are not
 2
    to yield your convictions simply because you're outnumbered.
    Your final vote must reflect your conscientious conviction as
    to how the issues should be decided.
 5
             Again, your verdict must be unanimous. And it is
 6
    necessary that each juror agree with the verdict.
 7
             Members of the jury, that concludes my instructions
 8
    on the law.
 9
             I just want to have one conference with counsel at
10
    sidebar, and after I do so, you can go back to the jury room
11
    with your -- to begin your deliberations.
12
             I will send out one copy of my jury instructions for
1.3
    you to have during your deliberations. So you will have that
14
    and obviously the nine copies of the verdict form.
15
             So let me just see counsel at sidebar.
16
             (At sidebar.)
17
             THE COURT: Are there any objections, additions,
18
    deletions, changes to the jury charge?
19
             MR. HARRIS: Nothing from the defendant.
20
             MS. MATTIACCI: Nothing from the plaintiff, Your
21
    Honor.
22
             THE COURT: Nothing from either side. Okay.
23
             (End of sidebar.)
24
             THE COURT: All right. With that, members of the
25
    jury, I'll ask you to go to the jury room now and begin your
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1
    deliberations.
 2
             And we'll send out the exhibit book also?
 3
             MS. MATTIACCI: We do have a book, Your Honor.
 4
             THE COURT: Yes. Okay.
 5
             All right. We'll stand in recess.
 6
             (Jury out.)
 7
             THE COURT: Counsel, just leave your phone numbers or
 8
    wherever you're going to be with Mr. Higgins, but I suggest,
 9
    based on my experience, sometimes juries have a quick question
10
    or two, so you might want to just be around the courtroom.
11
             MS. MATTIACCI: Okay.
12
             THE COURT: All right. But I'm not requiring you to
1.3
    stay here as long as you can get back to court in a reasonable
14
    period of time. All right?
15
             MS. MATTIACCI: I just had one question, Your Honor.
16
             In terms of the economic loss, back pay and front
    pay, in the event the jury does come back with liability, do
18
    you want us to be prepared to put on evidence today or
19
    tomorrow, or is that something that Your Honor would handle at
20
    a later time?
21
             THE COURT: It's something I'll handle in the future.
22
    If front pay and back pay becomes an issue in the case, I
23
    would like the parties to confer first and see whether or not
24
    there's any agreement on it. I don't know.
25
             MS. MATTIACCI: Okay.
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1
             THE COURT: If not, then we'll have a hearing.
 2
    right?
 3
             MS. MATTIACCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
             THE COURT: But we're not going to do that after the
 5
    verdict.
 6
             MS. MATTIACCI: Okay. Thank you.
 7
             THE COURT: All right. We'll stand in recess.
 8
             (Recess at 10:43 a.m. until 11:12 a.m.)
 9
             THE COURT: On the record.
10
             We have a question from the jury. It's signed by the
11
    foreperson, who is John Iadanza, Juror Number 6, I believe --
12
    I mean, 8, Juror Number 8, John Iadanza.
1.3
             We found an error on the verdict form, Section II,
14
    question 3, "Do you find the defendant," in quotes. We
15
    believe this should state plaintiff.
16
             And they're obviously correct, so what I would
17
    propose is I just bring the jury back in, and I tell them that
18
    they are correct, and that the foreperson just put a line
19
    through the word "defendant" and write the word "plaintiff"
20
    above it and initial -- put initials next to it.
21
             Would that be satisfactory or --
22
             MR. HARRIS: It is, Your Honor.
23
             MS. MATTIACCI: Yes, that's fine, Your Honor.
24
             THE COURT: All right. Let's bring in the jury,
25
    Mr. Higgins.
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1
             Where's Mr. Higgins?
 2
             (Jury in.)
 3
             THE COURT: Please be seated.
 4
             Members of the jury, I have a note that was sent to
 5
    me, and I've shared with counsel, signed by Mr. John Iadanza,
    Juror Number 8, who is the foreperson.
 7
             We found an error on the verdict form, Section II,
    question 3, "Do you find that defendant" -- that's in quotes.
 9
    We believe this should say plaintiff.
10
             And you are absolutely correct. We thank you for
11
    picking that up.
12
             And I've conferred with counsel, and we propose as a
1.3
    solution that the foreperson, Mr. Iadanza, just neatly put a
14
    line through "plaintiff" -- through "defendant" and write
15
    "plaintiff" right above it, and put your initials next to the
16
    word "plaintiff." Okay?
17
             And you can make that change just on the official
18
    verdict form, the one verdict form with your verdict.
19
             So with that, I'll ask you to go back and continue
20
    your deliberations.
21
             (Jury out.)
22
             THE COURT: And the question will be made part of the
23
    record.
24
             MS. MATTIACCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
25
             THE COURT: We'll stand in recess.
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1
             (Recess at 11:16 a.m. until 3:22 p.m.)
 2
             THE COURT: Counsel, we have a note from the jury.
 3
    We have reached a verdict.
 4
             Let's bring the jury in.
 5
             (Jury in.)
 6
             THE COURT: Please be seated.
 7
             Members of the jury, I have a note from you that I've
    shared with counsel.
 8
 9
             The note reads: We have reached a verdict.
10
             Would the foreperson please stand.
11
             THE FOREPERSON: I am, sir.
12
             THE COURT: This is John Iadanza.
1.3
             Has the jury reached a verdict?
14
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes, it has.
15
             THE COURT: Is the verdict unanimous?
16
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
17
             THE COURT: All right. May I see the slip?
18
             All right. I'll return the verdict slip to the
19
    courtroom deputy, and I'll ask the courtroom deputy to take
20
    the verdict.
21
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the United States District
22
    Court for the District of New Jersey, in the matter of Shannon
23
    Phillips, Plaintiff, v. Starbucks Corporation, Defendant,
24
    Civil Action Number 19-19432, Jury Verdict Form.
25
             I. Race Discrimination (federal claim):
```

```
1
             Question 1. Do you find that plaintiff has proven by
 2
    a preponderance of the evidence under Title VII that her race
 3
    was a determinative factor in defendant's decision to
    terminate her?
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
 5
 6
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: If you answered "Yes" to
 7
    Question 1, please skip to Question 3.
 8
             II. Race Discrimination (federal claim):
 9
             Question 3. Do you find that plaintiff has proven by
10
    a preponderance of the evidence under Section 1981 that her
11
    race was a determinative factor in defendant's decision to
12
    terminate her?
1.3
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
14
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Alternatives:
15
             If you answered "Yes" to Question 1 or Question 2,
16
    and "Yes" to Question 3, please proceed to Question 4.
17
             Question 4 -- I beg your pardon.
18
             III. Damages Under Title VII and Section 1981.
19
             Question 4. Has plaintiff proven by a preponderance
20
    of the evidence that she suffered compensatory damages for
21
    race discrimination as noted by a "Yes" response to questions
22
    1, 2, or 3?
23
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
24
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: If you answered "Yes" to
25
    Question 4, please proceed to Question 5 and provide the
```

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1
    amount of compensatory damages that you award for race
    discrimination.
 3
             Compensatory damages:
 4
             Question 5. What amount of money do you award
 5
    plaintiff as compensatory damages for violation of her
 6
    federally protected right not to be discriminated against in
 7
    employment on account of her race?
 8
             THE FOREPERSON: $300,000.
 9
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please proceed to the next
10
    question.
11
             Punitive damages:
12
             Question 6. Do you find that plaintiff has proven by
    a preponderance of the evidence that when defendant terminated
1.3
    plaintiff, it did so with reckless indifference to plaintiff's
14
15
    federally protected right not to be discriminated against in
16
    employment on account of her race?
17
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
18
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: If you answered "Yes" to
19
    Question 6, please proceed to Question 7.
20
             What amount of money do you award plaintiff as
21
    punitive damages for violation of her federally protected
22
    right not to be discriminated against in employment on account
23
    of her race?
24
             THE FOREPERSON: $12,500,000.
25
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please proceed to Question 8.
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1
             IV. Race discrimination (New Jersey Law Against
 2
    Discrimination):
 3
             Question Number 8. Do you find that plaintiff has
    proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
    violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination when it
    terminated plaintiff?
 7
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
 8
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: If you answered "Yes" to
 9
    Question 8, please proceed to Question 9.
10
             V. Damages under New Jersey Law Against
11
    Discrimination:
12
             Question 9. Has plaintiff proven by a preponderance
1.3
    of the evidence that she suffered compensatory damages for
14
    race discrimination as noted by the "Yes" response to
15
    Ouestion 8?
16
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
17
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: If you answered "Yes" to
18
    Question 9, please proceed to Question 10 and provide the
19
    amount of compensatory damages that you award for race
20
    discrimination.
21
             Question 10. What amount of money do you award
22
    plaintiff as compensatory damages for violation of plaintiff's
23
    state-protected right not to be discriminated against in
24
    employment on account of her race?
25
             THE FOREPERSON: $300,000.
```

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1
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please proceed to the next
 2
    question.
 3
             Question 11. Do you find that the plaintiff -- that
    plaintiff has proven by clear and convincing evidence that at
    least one member of defendant's upper management employees
    acted in wanton and willful disregard of plaintiff's right not
 7
    to be discriminated against in employment on account of her
 8
    race?
 9
             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
10
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: If you answered "Yes" to
11
    Question 11, please proceed to Question 12.
12
             Question 12. What amount of money do you award
1.3
    plaintiff as punitive damages for violation of her
14
    state-protected right not to be discriminated against in
15
    employment on account of her race?
16
             THE FOREPERSON: $12,500,000.
17
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Very well.
18
             THE COURT: All right. You may be seated.
19
             Request to have the jury polled?
20
             MR. HARRIS: Yes, Your Honor. Please.
21
             THE COURT: All right. Please poll the jury.
22
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 1, do you agree with
23
    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
24
             JUROR NUMBER 1: Yes.
25
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 2, do you agree with
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1
    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
 2
             JUROR NUMBER 2: Yes.
 3
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Jury Number 3, do you agree with
    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
 5
             JUROR NUMBER 3: Yes.
 6
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 4, do you agree with
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    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
 8
             JUROR NUMBER 4: Yes, I do.
 9
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Jury Number 5, do you agree with
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    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
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             JUROR NUMBER 5: Yes.
12
             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 6, do you agree with
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    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
14
             JUROR NUMBER 6: Yes, sir.
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             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 7, do you agree with
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    the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
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             JUROR NUMBER 7: Yes.
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             THE DEPUTY CLERK: And, Juror Number 8, do you agree
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    with the verdict as it's been stated by the foreperson?
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             THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
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             THE DEPUTY CLERK: Very well.
22
             THE COURT: All right. I'll order that the Jury
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    Verdict Form be signed.
24
             Members of the jury, that concludes your service, and
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    I want to thank you for your participation in this case, not
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only on behalf of myself but on behalf of all the judges that
sit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. We thank you for participating in this most
important public service.
         At this point, I would ask you just to go back to the
jury room and wait for some further instructions from me.
will not be long.
         Thank you.
         (Jury out.)
         THE COURT: Please be seated.
         Counsel, the issue that remains is the front pay and
back pay, and I think there might be some other matters that
have to be resolved in this case. But perhaps counsel can at
this point, now that you have a jury verdict, confer and see
whether or not you can't come to some agreement on some
matters. All right?
         MR. HARRIS: Yes, sir.
         THE COURT: All right. So is there anything else
anyone wants to put on the record at this point?
         MS. MATTIACCI: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
         MR. HARRIS: I have nothing at this point.
         THE COURT: All right. I want to thank both counsel
for their efforts in this case. When counsel acts in the best
interests of their client and makes a professional
presentation, it certainly advances the cause of justice, and
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    we saw that from all concerned in this case.
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             So with that, we'll stand in recess now.
 3
             I always go back and thank the jury personally for
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    their service, and I'll do so now.
 5
             All right. We'll stand in recess.
 6
             (Proceedings concluded at 3:34 p.m.)
 7
 8
             I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
 9
    from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
10
11
    /S/ Ann Marie Mitchell 12th day of June, 2023
12
    Court Reporter/Transcriber Date
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